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Abstract 
There is no standard rule for the definition of an “optimal level” of international 
reserves and several assumptions underlie the rationale behind holding reserves. 
There are various theoretical approaches, but no standard for the evaluation of the 
performance of “optimal level” models, and their parameters are difficult to 
estimate. The literature suggests that the benefits of holding reserves are high, but 
the accumulation of reserves is a costly strategy. In fact, in a world of high 
liquidity and free capital flow, establishing an adequate level of international 
reserves is still a puzzle. The strategy of accumulating international reserves is 
evaluated here using data from the 2008-2010 crisis and it is shown that countries 
with higher international reserve levels had less adjustment costs between 2008 
and 2010. The cost-benefit relationship of holding reserves in the 2008-2010 crisis 
is also discussed based on a sample with 71 countries. 
Keywords: international reserves, crisis, central banks 
JEL Classification: E44, E58, F21, F31, F41. 
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The literature concerning international reserve holdings has increased in recent years as 
many authors have tried to explain the growth of international reserve holdings in 
emerging market economies since the crises of the1990s. According to this literature 
there are several reasons for holding international reserves, including the provision of 
coverage for transaction operations and liquidity for debt payments, as a precaution 
against capital outflows, and to serve mercantilist and wealth management purposes. 
International reserves may also be a by-product of foreign exchange rate policy. 
Despite all the effort that has gone into research there is no unified methodology to use 
as a reference for the process of reserves accumulation. This problem may be a 
consequence of the different rationale each country applies when defining its 
international reserves accumulation policy. The difficulties are also related to the 
measurement of the relevant variables that each model takes into account and also to the 
fact that it is difficult to establish a measurement of performance for the myriad of 
available models.  
This paper contributes to the literature since it produces empirical evidence to show that 
countries with higher levels of international reserves had lower adjustment costs in the 
period of the financial crisis of 2008-2010
1. The paper also discusses the cost and 
benefit relationship of international reserve holdings in a sample with 71 countries. The 
aim of the paper is not to provide an answer to the optimal reserves level conundrum 
but to contribute to this debate with empirical findings.  
A literature review is discussed in the next section where it is also presented some 
findings in the empirical literature regarding the 2008-2010 crisis. In the recent 
empirical literature some authors find econometric evidence that international reserves 
helped countries to avoid the worst scenario while some others do not find this 
econometric evidence. In the third section it is presented an econometric analysis 
applied in the sample of 71 countries and it is shown that international reserves worked 
as an insurance against a crisis irrespective of the motivation for holding them. This 
                                                 
1   The crisis is considered here to run from 2008 to 2010, since many countries had problems with 
GDP growth during this period. Some may argue that the crisis started earlier and that it was not over by 




section also discusses the cost-benefit relationship of holding reserves. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented. 
2- Literature review 
Traditionally the rationale behind holding reserves associates them with precaution and 
transaction considerations. Grimes (1993) argues that a country with a free floating 
foreign exchange rate policy will not intervene in the foreign currency market as long as 
the nature of the shocks to the exchange rate remain predominantly nominal, but may 
wish to intervene if it perceives that the stochastic environment has changed, and this 
intervention will affect the level of international reserves. According to Hawkins and 
Rangarajan (1970) international reserves may be viewed as national wealth in some 
cases, but also as a tool to finance balance-of-payments deficits. Other motives are 
mentioned in the literature, such as strengthening the bargaining position of a country in 
debt negotiations (Kohlscheen and O'Connell, 2004 and Detragiache, 1996) and the 
political considerations mentioned by Aizenman and Marion (2002a, 2002b and 2004).  
Allen et al. (2002) propose an approach to analyzing crises in the government, financial 
and non-financial private sectors. According to the authors, an asset-liability currency 
match is crucial for crisis prevention. Turner and Moreno (2004) state that an integrated 
approach to managing risks in a broader national context is needed. The controversial 
question is how far the government should react to private sector decisions regarding 
their own balance sheet.  
The crises in the 1990s showed how vulnerable countries were to capital flows. Since 
the Asian crisis countries in that region have substantially increased levels of 
international reserves to prevent similar episodes. Turner and Moreno (2004) argue that 
the increase in international reserve holdings in Asian countries is a consequence of a 
policy of currency devaluation, while Aizenman and Lee (2005) considered the 
importance of precautionary and mercantilist motives in accounting for the hoarding of 
international reserves by developing countries and concluded that the variables 
associated with mercantilism, although statistically significant, could only account for a 
small part of reserve accumulation. Accordingly, they state that the degree of capital 
account liberalization is a more conspicuous variable, and empirical evidence suggests 




accumulation process in developing countries. Mateos y Lago et al. (2009) analyze the 
debate surrounding the International Monetary System and the weaknesses inherent to 
having a dominant country-issued reserve currency at a time of growing world demand 
for liquid reserve assets, particularly in emerging markets which attempt to self-insure 
against costly capital account crises.  
The adequacy of international reserve holdings is also an open question linked to the 
motivation issue discussed above. There are several approaches but no standard for the 
calculation of an “optimal level”. Four of them are discussed in this section: cover 
indicators, cost-benefit analysis, macroeconomic relationships and insurance 
approaches.  
An adequate level of international reserves was previously considered to be the amount 
needed to cover at least three months of imports. Given increased capital flows this rule 
has generally come to be regarded as outdated (Mulder, 2000). A coverage indicator of 
international reserves adequacy which has become very popular is the amount needed to 
cover the short-term external debt (IMF, 2000 and IMF, 2004). The ratio of reserves to 
short-term external debt is a guide to reserve adequacy based on currency and financial 
crisis concerns
2. Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001) extended the Guidotti ratio by adding 
an M2 percentage to the Guidotti rule for reserves requirements. The authors state that, 
besides short-term debt, the calculation of an adequate level of reserves should also 
include a monetary supply ratio to take the possibility of capital outflows into account. 
Heller (1966) was the first to analyse international reserves adequacy using a cost-
benefit approach. According to Heller, a country can use some policies, such as 
expenditure-switching entailing welfare reduction, to mitigate external imbalances. 
Heller's model considers the avoidance of adjustment costs as a benefit of holding 
reserves. Clark (1970) developed a structural model based on this assumption 
considering the variability of reserve levels and the costs of adjustment
3. In the buffer 
stock model (inventory model) proposed by Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) an optimal 
reserves levels depends on the variability of international transactions, where reserves 
work as a buffer stock to accommodate fluctuations in external transactions, and it is 
expected that the optimal stock level is positively correlated to the extent of these 
                                                 
2   This ratio is known as Guidotti ratio. 
3   Some papers which apply the cost-benefit approach are Flood and Marion (2002), Ramachandran (2004), Mora and 




fluctuations and negatively correlated to carrying costs, since they are invested at lower 
rates than the opportunity costs
4. Several empirical papers deal with variants of the cost-
benefit approach
5.  
The costs of financial crisis are measured as a function of the gap between the GDP 
after the crisis and the potential GDP if the crisis had not occured. According to Ben-
Bassat and Gottlieb the more open a country is, the higher the GDP contraction due to a 
financial crisis will be. The cost-benefit approach is very sensitive to the factors which 
are assumed to underlie it, i.e. adjustment and opportunity costs and the crisis 
probability.  
One alternative approach to evaluating international reserve holdings is to consider a 
macroeconomic model in which reserves are endogenous. Aizenman and Marion (2002) 
and Ades and Fuentes (2005) take this kind of approach, treating international reserves 
as a dependent variable in a panel regression with GDP per capita, population, volatility 
of exports, imports to GDP ratio and volatility of the nominal exchange rate. The 
rationale given in Aizenman and Marion (2002) is that reserves holdings should 
increase with the size of international transactions and with a country's population and 
standard of living. Reserves holdings should increase with the volatility of international 
receipts and payments and they should be positively correlated with the volatility of a 
country's exports. According to the authors, since reserves should increase with 
concerns about the vulnerability to external shocks, they should be positively correlated 
with the average propensity to import
6. Obstfeld et al. (2008) investigate the empirical 
determinants of reserve growth and they consider the log of the ratio of M2 to GDP, a 
measure of financial openness, a pegged exchange rate dummy and a soft-peg exchange 
rate dummy. They conclude that reserve holdings are explicable, since they did not find 
major under prediction (at least not systematically), and they did not identify the 
suspected excessive accumulation in emerging-markets.  
Some papers, like Caballero and Panageas (2003), Caballero and Panageas (2004a and 
2004b), Cordella and Yeyati (2005) and Lee (2004), have driven discussions of 
                                                 
4   Bar-Ilan and Marion (2004) propose a model of optimal reserve holdings where the reserve authority controls the 
upward and downward drift of international reserves and chooses the trigger points which induce changes in drift.  
5   Salman and Salih (1999), Ramachandran (2004) and Silva and Silva (2004) model the dynamics of international 
reserves using a GARCH specification. An interesting feature in these works is that they use time series for individual countries 
(Turkey, India and Brazil respectively) rather than working with cross-sectional data. 





international reserve holdings in a different direction. Cordella and Yeyati (2005) 
discuss some forms of national insurance, such as capital controls, self-insurance 
(accumulation of international reserves), private insurance (hard to find) and IMF 
packages. Caballero and Panageas (2004a and 2004b) argue that central banks should 
adopt best-risk-management practices and they give the example of including the CBOE 
Volatility Index (VIX) in a reserves portfolio. Lee (2004) uses an approach based on 
option pricing which evaluates the insurance value of reserves. Jeanne and Rancière 
(2009) present a model for the optimal level of international reserves for a small open 
economy seeking insurance against sudden stops in capital flows. This is a modification 
to a previous paper which the same authors published in 2005. The optimal level of 
reserves is quite sensitive to the probability of a sudden stop, the risk premium and the 
risk aversion parameter. 
It is important to highlight that the literature on adequacy of international reserve 
holdings rely on the benefits and costs. International reserves holdings may reduce the 
fall in the GDP growth rate, the borrowing costs and the fiscal costs in a crisis. 
However, reserves holdings imply carrying costs. Hutchison (2001) investigates the fall 
in real GDP in 1998 for five East Asian countries that experienced a severe currency 
and balance of payments crisis in 1997. He evaluates predicted versus unpredicted 
growth and states that the largest unexpected fall in real GDP was in Indonesia (17.6 
percentage points) and the smallest was in the Philippines (3 percentage points).  
Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) apply a log-linear equation which measures the current 
difference between actual GDP after a default and potential GDP (expected GDP) that 
would have occurred if the economy had continued to grow at the pre-default growth 
rate. The difference between the actual and predicted GDP is a function of the level of 
openness of the economy and according to the authors, output loss is higher than 50% 
of annual GDP.  
Hoggarth et al. (2001) find that the cumulative output losses incurred during crisis 
periods were roughly 14%-24%, on average, of annual GDP. They cite other authors 
who put output losses in the range of 6%-8% of annual GDP for single banking crises 
but usually well over 10%, on average, when they are accompanied by currency crises 
("twin" crises). Hoggarth, Reis and Saporta (2001) report output losses of 15%-20% of 




accompanied by a decline in output growth in the order of 4%. Gupta (2002) reports 
costs of 5.1% of annual GDP for currency or banking crises and 13.3% of GDP for 
"twin" crisis. Jeanne and Rancière (2005) calibrate their model for an optimal level of 
reserves considering output losses of 10% of GDP.  
Haldane, Hoggarth and Saporta (2004) emphasize that “twin crisis” episodes, when 
banking instability and sharp pressures on a country’s exchange rate occur at the same 
time, are associated with larger losses of GDP than single crises. Furthermore, estimates 
of fiscal costs are also larger.
7 Komarek and Melecky (2005) confirm the greater 
severity of crises with more than one cause (twin crisis). They report cumulative losses 
for current account reversals of 2% and for joint of current account and currency crises 
of 21% of GDP. Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000) report losses in the range of 4%-
9%.  
Recently, Laeven and Valencia (2008) prepared a database with detailed data of 
currency crises and sovereign debt crises from 1970 to 2007. According to the authors, 
fiscal costs (net of recoveries) associated with crisis management average about 13.3% 
of GDP, and can be as high as 55.1%. Recoveries of fiscal outlays also vary widely, 
with the average recovery rate reaching 18.2% of gross fiscal costs. Finally, output 
losses (measured as deviations from the GDP trend) of systemic banking crises can be 
large, averaging about 20% of GDP during the first four years of a crisis, and ranging 
from a low of 0% to a high of 98%. 
There are costs to holding international reserves. Aizenman (2007) points out that there 
are fiscal costs, including direct opportunity costs in the form of the marginal product of 
public capital and/or the cost of external borrowing, and the quasi costs of sterilization. 
When the central bank buys foreign currency in the domestic market, it sells domestic 
currency. In order to avoid impact on interest rates, which may undermine monetary 
policy, the central bank sterilizes the operations with repurchase agreement operations 
(repo). The cost of repo operations is close to the short term interest rate. Note that 
international reserves are normally invested abroad with lower yields, particularly for 
                                                 
7   Silva Junior (2010) discusses the degree of freedom that a country has to manage a crisis if it has enough international 
reserves. According to the author, international reserves help an emerging market to operate with lower interest rates during a crisis 
than those which would be needed in an environment with low international reserves. For those countries with high domestic debt, 
lower interest rates are a fiscal benefit of international reserves. Note that international reserves themselves are not sufficient to 
operate with lower interest rates during a crisis, but they are a necessary requirement for this purpose. It is also worth mentioning 




emerging market economies. So, the difference between domestic and international 
interest rates (in general US yields for the relevant maturity) may be considered as the 
carrying costs of reserve holdings.  
Despite the fact that the costs of carrying reserves can be seen as the costs of 
sterilization, it is important to remember that not all reserves are sterilized. For example, 
the returns on international reserves investments do not need to be sterilized in the 
market. Furthermore, foreign exchange reserves may also be funded from foreign 
currency borrowings rather than domestic monetary liabilities (The Central Bank 
Governance Group, 2009), so it is important to discuss the funding of reserves and their 
real opportunity costs. 
It could also be argued that the opportunity costs of holding international reserves may 
be seen as the interest rate paid by the Treasury on the domestic debt, since foreign 
assets may be used to reduce debt.  
International reserves are a source of financial risk on the central bank balance sheet. 
An appreciation of the domestic currency reduces the value of foreign assets since they 
are marked to market on the balance sheet. International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) require “fair value” accounting, which means that assets and liabilities must be 
marked to market. This approach may produce high variability in the income statements 
of central banks, which in turn raises issues with regard to the determination of the 
amount to be transferred to the government or received from the government. For some 
central banks that distribute income, the revaluation gains and losses which are not 
realised receive special treatment (The Central Bank Governance Group, 2009). Note 
that a “fair value” account does not mean that a gain or a loss has been realized.  
The literature evaluating the impact of the recent global crisis on advanced economies 
and emerging markets is still evolving. This literature relies on econometric analysis to 
determine whether countries' economic fundamentals or others issues explain why the 
impact was different for each country. Berkmen et. al. (2009), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2010), Blanchard et. al. (2010) and Llaudes et. al. (2010) conduct econometric analysis 
with a measure of economic growth as the dependent variable. The authors use some 
explanatory variables which include trade, debt, financial market issues, population and 




differences among these studies in the specification of the models, the size of the 
samples and the definition of dependent and independent variables. The focus in these 
papers is a set of variables which may explain the impact of the recent global crisis.  
Berkmen et. al. (2009) find that financial factors such as leverage (measured as the 
credit to deposit ratio), appear to have been key in determining the size of the growth 
revision for emerging markets. According to them, the stock of international reserves 
(measured in numerous ways, such as a share of GDP, exports, or short-term debt) did 
not have a statistically significant effect on the growth revisions. 
Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2010) find a strong link between the fall in GDP growth rate 
(and also in domestic demand) and pre-crisis domestic financial factors such as rapid 
private credit growth and external imbalances measured as current account deficits. 
They find, albeit with less econometric robustness, a relationship between GDP growth 
(and also demand) and real-side variables such as trade openness and manufacturing 
share. They also find that countries with pegged exchange rate regimes experienced 
weaker output growth during the crisis and they find some evidence that countries with 
higher reserves experienced smaller declines in demand. They find that emerging and 
developing countries with higher short-term debt as a ratio of reserves experienced 
sharper declines in output and demand.  
Some of the findings of Llaudes et. al. (2010) are aligned with those of Milesi-Ferreti 
(2010). Llaudes et. al. (2010) conclude that emerging markets with smaller initial 
vulnerabilities went into recession later and exited earlier, and suffered smaller declines 
in output during the first stage of the crisis. Emerging markets with greater external 
linkage (dependence on demand from advanced economies or exposure to foreign bank 
claims) experienced sharper falls in output. Countries with pre-crisis credit booms had 
sharper output falls since the credit booms were typically foreign-financed and the 
credit booms were more pronounced for countries with fixed exchange rate regimes. 
Llaudes et. al. (2010) also conclude that reserves, up to a certain point, helped dampen 
the impact of the crisis on emerging markets. Blanchard et. al. (2010) find that the most 
significantly robust variable explaining the fall in GDP growth rate is short-term 
external debt, suggesting a central role for the financial channel in the crisis. They did 
not find econometric evidence that international reserve holdings were important buffers 




3- Data Analysis for the 2008-2010 Crisis 
In the aftermath of the 2008-2010 crisis it is possible to determine whether the strategy 
of international reserves accumulation served its purpose as insurance or not. As many 
countries suffered from the impact of the crisis in different ways, the question of 
whether there was any relationship between levels of international reserves and the 
impact of the crisis is investigated in this section . The approach is similar to that used 
by the authors referred to in the previous section, but crisis period is different and the 
specification of the problem is also diffrent. The sample consists of 71 countries 
including 49 emerging markets.
8  
The impact of the crisis is measured here as average GDP growth for the years 2008- 
2010, i.e. an average of three years of GDP growth minus the expected growth 
(measured as the average annual growth from 2000 to 2007). This difference is 
considered here as unexpected growth. Data were collected from the “Country 
Economic Report & GDP Data” section of the Global Finance website and the IMF 
Special Data Dissemination Standard (SDDS).
9  
3.1- The self insurance effectiveness of international reserves  
Five explanatory variables were chosen in order to evaluate the behaviour of the GDP in 
the sample countries during the crisis. The first variable is the value of shares in the 
capital market divided by GDP. This is considered to be a proxy of openness and 
development in a country’s capital market. The second explanatory variable is a dummy 
of one (1) for developed economies and zero (0) for non-developed economies. The 
third variable is the total external debt of a country divided by GDP. The fourth variable 
is annual imports divided by GDP, which is used to capture openness in the trade 
                                                 
8   Lane and Milesi-Ferreti (2010) consider a full sample of 176 countries and for robustness they 
split the sample into advanced economies and non-advanced economies. Berkmen et. al. (2009), Llaudes 
et. al. (2010) and Blanchard et. al. (2010) focus their analysis of the impact of the crisis on emerging 
markets. Berkmen et. al. (2009) use data from 43 countries, although some robustness tests were run with 
a larger sample. Llaudes et. al. (2010) consider a sample of 57 economies and Blanchard et. al. (2010) use 
a sample consisting of 29 countries. 
9   Blanchard et. al. (2010) consider unexpected growth as the forecast error for output growth 
during the semester composed of 2008:4 and 2009:1. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010) apply econometric 
analysis with average GDP growth in 2008-2009 as the dependent variable and among the explanatory 
variables they include the average GDP growth over 2005-07. Llaudes et. al. (2010) use four alternative 
measures of output loss to assess the robustness of their findings. The preferred measure used by the 
authors is the country-specific peak to trough percentage change in quarterly seasonally adjusted real 
GDP. Berkmen et. al. (2009) focus on revisions of projections for GDP growth in 2009. They compare 




account, and finally the amount of international reserves divided by GDP is 
investigated. Table 1 shows the correlation matrix for these explanatory variables. 
Table 1 – Correlation of explanatory variables 
MKT_GDP DUMMY DEB_GDP IMP_GDP RES_GDP
MKT_GDP 1.00 -0.11 0.46 0.03 0.16
DUMMY -0.11 1.00 0.38 -0.21 -0.35
DEB_GDP 0.46 0.38 1.00 0.06 -0.04
IMP_GDP 0.03 -0.21 0.06 1.00 0.63
RES_GDP 0.16 -0.35 -0.04 0.63 1.00 
The highest correlation (0.63) is found between international reserves and imports. This 
means that it is difficult to include these two variables in the same regression as 
explanatory variables for crisis impact because of multi-colinearity problems. The high 
correlation between international reserves and imports suggests that the more a country 
imports the more international reserves are required for precautionary purposes. The 
second highest correlation (0.46) is between external debt and the market value of 
stocks. This is to be expected since the more open capital markets are, the more equity 
and fixed income assets are available. The high correlation between external debt and 
the dummy implies multi-colinearity problems if both variables are included in the same 
regression. The negative correlation between reserves and the dummy suggests 
developed economies hold fewer reserves than non-developed economies and this 
points in the same direction as much of the empirical evidence.  
This brief analysis suggests that because of multi-colinearity, it is not feasible to include 
all the variables in the same regression equation in order to evaluate the impact of the 
crisis on the sample countries. However, including all the variables in the same 
regression is unnecessary since there are two different problems to be investigated. 
Firstly it is necessary to differentiate the reserves accumulation strategies of the 
countries in the sample, and then to control the results of those strategies in the crisis in 
order to evaluate their effectiveness as insurance.  
The first equation to be estimated is international reserves as a function of imports and 
the dummy variable (see equation 1). This relationship captures one dimension of the 
strategy of holding international reserves, which is to have a minimum amount of 




the empirical evidence in the literature shows that developed economies hold lower 
reserves.  
      ( 1 )  
So, the relationship between international reserves holdings and imports allow us to 
control the transaction motivation for holding reserves, making it possible to evaluate 
the insurance effect during the crisis. This means that with the identification of the 
relationship between reserves and imports it is possible to differentiate countries with 
different degrees of commercial openness and the different impact of the crisis on the 
sample economies. Note that the aim is neither to state that international reserves are 
held only for trade purposes nor to suggest an adequate measure for reserves holdings. 
Table 2 shows that on average international reserves represent 63% of annual imports 
and developed economies have fewer reserves than non-developed economies. 
Table 2 – International reserves as a function of imports 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  p-Value 
Imports 0.634  0.055  0.000 
Dummy -0.073  0.032  0.027 
R
2: 0.414.  
White correction for heteroscedasticity.   
It is now possible to investigate the economic impact of the crisis on the countries in the 
sample during the 2008-2010 financial crisis and evaluate the insurance effect of 
international reserves. Average annual GDP growth in the three years 2008-2010 minus 
the proxy for expected growth (average from 2000 to 2007) is taken as a function of the 
sum of stock market sizes and external debt. Since the crisis was financial, the 
hypothesis is that the more open its capital markets were the more a country would 
suffer the impact of the crisis. Furthermore, the difference between international 
reserves and the result of the estimation from equation (1) is also considered as 




international reserves may work as insurance against a crisis and that the size of 
international reserves is normalized by the result of equation (1) for each country.  
 
(2) 
The impact of the crisis therefore is taken as a function of the size of the capital market 
and external debt as a fraction of GDP and the excess of international reserves over 
annual imports. The expected rationale behind this regression is that if the country had 
higher levels of international reserves measured against an average level it would suffer 
less in a crisis. The coefficient for this variable would therefore be positive. 
Furthermore, this rationale also implies that a more open capital market exposed the 
country to the impact of the crisis and the expected coefficient for openness is negative. 
Table 3 shows the result of this regression with the statistically significant coefficients. 
These two regressions do not show that the main rationale for accumulating 
international reserves is the precautionary purpose. However they do show that 
international reserves work as insurance against a crisis irrespective of the motivation 
for holding them, since higher levels of reserves helped some countries to avoid the 
main negative impact of the crisis in terms of GDP fall. It is important to highlight that 
international reserves are not the only variable to take into account in explaining the 
behaviour of some economies during the 2008-2010 crisis. Furthermore, the main 
purpose of this study is not to argue that the level of international reserves is a purely 
exogenous decision. The above regressions simply aim to show that economies with 
higher levels of reserves reacted better to the crisis, as the literature review indicates. 
This data does not allow the reader to address the issue of defining an optimal level for 
international reserves or even to conclude that international reserves are the only means 
of avoiding a contagious crisis. The econometric findings here are similar to those of 






 Table 3 – Average GDP fall in three years as a function of reserves and capital market 
size 
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error p-Value 
Constant -0.0290 0.0038  0.0000 
Market+Debt -0.0011  0.0004  0.0052 
Reserves-E(Reserves)  0.0723 0.0207 0.0008 
R
2: 0.296 
White correction for heteroscedasticity. 
3.2- Robustness tests 
One of the aims of this paper is to verify whether international reserves contributed as a 
buffer to the impact of the recent global crisis. The robustness tests focus on this issue. 
Note that recently some authors have investigated the role of several variables in the 
crisis. With regard to international reserves, Llaudes et. al. (2010) and Milesi-Ferreti 
(2010) find econometric evidence that international reserves helped some countries to 
avoid a worse GDP fall, while Blanchard et. al. (2010) and Berkmen et. al. (2009) do 
not. As it is mentioned before, table 3 shows econometric evidence that international 
reserves helped to cushion the fall in GDP growth during the period of 2008-2010 in 
line with Llaudes et. al. (2010) and Milesi-Ferreti (2010). Robustness tests are shown in 
tables 4, 5 and 6. In table 4 the robustness tests are focused on specifications similar to 
those in equations 1 and 2. Table 5 shows robustness tests with unexpected GDP growth 
as the dependent variable and imports, market, debt and reserves as dependent variables, 
a specification similar to that in Llaudes et. al. (2010), Blanchard et. al. (2010) and 
Berkmen et. al. (2009). Table 6 shows robustness tests with realized GDP growth as the 







Table 4 – Robustness tests for Equations 1 and 2 
Variables  Base  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5 
Eq1        
Imports  0.634  0.647  0.634  0.647  0.634  0.647 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Dummy  -0.073  ---  -0.073  ---  -0.073  --- 
  0.027  ---  0.027  ---  0.027  --- 
R2  0.414  0.395  0.414  0.395  0.414  0.395 
        
Eq2        
Constant  -0.029  -0.029  0.018  0.027  -0.067  -0.070 
  0.000  0  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Market+Debt  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  -0.002  -0.002 
  0.005  0.006  0.000  0.000  0.021  0.024 
Reserves-E(Reserves)  0.072  0.079  0.077  0.080  0.110  0.124 
  0.001  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.001  0.002 
R2  0.296  0.308  0.313  0.378  0.261  0.278 
Case 1: Developed countries (DC) removed from the sample. 
Case 2: Only average growth from 2008-2010 as dependent variable. 
Case 3: Only realized growth as dependent variable with DC removed. 
Case 4: Unexpected growth: Growth from 2009 minus average growth from 2000-2007. 
Case 5: Case 4 with DC removed. 





The approach of equations 1 and 2 was used in order to minimize the problem of multi-
colinearity and to capture information from a sample including both developed and 
emerging economies. Results are robust however and the conclusions do not change, 
even with specifications similar to Llaudes et. al. (2010), Milesi-Ferreti (2010), 
Blanchard et. al. (2010) and Berkmen et. al. (2009), as tables 5 and 6 show. These tests 
therefore show that the cushioning effect on the fall in GDP growth provided by 
international reserves during the 2008-2010 crisis has robust econometric support. 
Table 5 – Robustness tests with specifications similar to Llaudes et. al. (2010), 
Blanchard et. al. (2010) and Berkmen et. al. (2009) 
Variables Base  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5 
Constant  -0.027  -0.028  -0.024  -0.028  -0.031  -0.032 
  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.000 
Imports  -0.049  -0.056  -0.037  -0.044  -0.067  -0.074 
  0.008  0.011  0.057  0.042  0.004  0.007 
Market  -0.001  -0.001      -0.001  -0.001 
  0.003  0.003      0.021  0.022 
Debt      -0.005  -0.009     
      0.000  0.004     
Reserves  0.070  0.078  0.048  0.071  0.070  0.079 
  0.001  0.002  0.035  0.009  0.010  0.021 
R2  0.287  0.314  0.151  0.190  0.271  0.298 
Case1: Developed countries (DC) removed from the sample. 
Case 2: Change explanatory variable from Market to Debt. 
Case 3: Developed countries (DC) removed from the sample. 
Case 4: Unexpected growth: Average growth from 2008-2009 minus average growth from 2000-2007. 
Case 5: Case 4 and DC removed. 




Table 6 – Robustness tests with specifications similar to Milesi-Ferreti (2010) 
Variables Base  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4  Case 5 
Past growth  0.395  0.395  0.419  0.387  0.386  0.270 
  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.003  0.015 
Imports  -0.043  -0.045  -0.053  -0.039  -0.073  -0.062 
  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.027  0.002  0.001 
Market  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001    -0.001  -0.001 
  0.027  0.000  0.004    0.007  0.000 
Debt  -0.003    0.002  -0.010     
  0.096    0.701  0.001     
Dummy    -0.008         
    0 . 0 6 0       
Reserves  0.075  0.075  0.081  0.076  0.081  0.098 
  0.000  0.000  0.001  0.002  0.011  0.000 
R2  0.435  0.431  0.377  0.262  0.357  0.383 
Case 1: Change explanatory variable from Debt to Dummy. 
Case 2: Developed countries (DC) removed from the sample. 
Case 3: Developed countries (DC) removed from the sample and explanatory variable Market removed 
from specification. 
Case 4: Case 2 with dependent variable changed from average growth in 2008-2010 to average growth in 
2008-2009. 
Case 5: Case 2 with dependent variable changed from average growth in 2008-2010 to average growth in 
2009-2010. 







3.3- The cost-benefit relationship 
The cost-benefit relationship of the strategy of accumulating international reserves is 
also investigated here on the basis of the 2008-2010 data. The costs and benefits are 
measured as fractions of GDP. In this study, costs are considered to be equated to the 
difference between domestic interest rates and the return on investment of international 
reserves. The benefits are associated with the avoidance of four problems: a GDP fall, 
loss of tax revenues, increase in domestic borrowing costs and external borrowing costs.  
The cost-benefit analysis in Table 7 is only a base case. This base case was built on the 
possible scenario of a 10% fall in GDP during a crisis (if a country does not have 
enough reserves). This possible scenario finds support in the literature, and the 
empirical evidence in figure 1 from the period of 2008-2010 shows that some countries 
had an average fall in GDP above 4% in those three years (above 10% in the 
compounded period). The first benefit in the base case scenario is therefore considered 
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Figure 1 – Histogram of annual average GDP growth in the period 2008-2010  
In fact the criteria underlying figure 1 could be considered to be very conservative, 
since potential GDP growth is not included. This means that the difference between 
GDP growth and expected GDP growth should be used as a measure of loss in a crisis. 
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Figure 2 – Histogram of annual average GDP growth minus expected growth in the 
period 2008-2010  
The second benefit is fiscal and it is related to the avoidance of tax losses. Loss of tax 
income in a scenario with a 10% fall in GDP is evaluated on the basis of fiscal charge 
data from the countries in the sample. 
The benefits of avoiding higher burdens in the rollover of domestic debt in a crisis are 
difficult to measure since it would be necessary to evaluate the structure and the 
maturity of the domestic debt and the interest rates to be considered as the “level of 
avoidance of higher burdens” among others features. Some specific crisis events serve 
to illustrate the problem. In the Mexico crisis in 1995 there was an increase of 37% in 
annual average domestic interest rates. In the Asia crisis in 1997 there were increases in 
annual average domestic interest rates of 2.2% in Korea, 1.6% in Singapore, 1.3% in 
Taiwan and 6.8% in Thailand. In Russia annual average domestic interest rates 
increased 27.1% in 1998. During Argentina's debt crisis its annual average domestic 
interest rates increased 21.4%. In Brazil, domestic interest rates increased from 17.5% 
in 2001 to 22.9% in 2003 in a period including events such as contagion from the crisis 
in Argentina and the transition period between elections in 2002 and a new government 




The maturity of debt and rollover strategy make it more difficult to evaluate the benefit 
of avoiding higher interest rates. The real impact of higher interest rates over the three 
years can only be estimated. The base case scenario supposes there to be a rollover of 
total domestic and external debt during the three-year period. 
Evaluating the benefit of avoiding higher burdens on the external debt is not an easy 
task either. Figure 3 shows the EMBI global stripped spread. Note that the spreads did 
not reach the levels of the 1998-2002 period (808 bp on average). They remained at an 
average of 395 bp during the 2008-2010 period. 400 bp could therefore be taken as an 









Figure 3 – Embi Global stripped spread (basis points) 
In order to illustrate all the benefits the base case supposes a 1% increase in domestic 
interest rates (increase in the costs of a domestic debt rollover) and a 1% increase in the 
costs of borrowing externally if the country does not have the adequate level of self 
insurance. This means that the carrying costs of debt should be higher in a crisis if the 
country did not have enough international reserves.  
It is also necessary to evaluate some assumptions regarding the costs of holding 
international reserves. As mentioned above, the costs of holding reserves are measured 
as the difference between domestic interest rates and the return on international reserves 
investments. The base scenario of Table 3 supposes a return on international reserves of 




its international reserves investments and Switzerland reported 4.56%. This measure of 
costs is not a consensus since some authors argue that social opportunity costs would be 
a more adequate measure. Social opportunity costs are however difficult to find. In an 
alternative of costs measurement, the Central Bank of Brazil publishes a measure of 
international reserves carrying costs in its balance sheet based on a kind of weighted 
average cost of capital considering all the costs of its liabilities. 
Note that the costs are measured on a one year basis but the benefits are measured as the 
adjustment cost reduction of a single crisis. In this scenario the average crisis 
adjustment cost reduction benefit is 14.45% of GDP and the average annual cost of 
holding reserves is 1.34%, excluding countries where domestic interest rates are equal 
to or lower than in the scenario of a 1% return on international reserves investments.  
It is important to highlight that a cost-benefit analysis in which costs and benefits are 
measured on different bases would be more complete if it were to include the 
probability of a crisis occurring, by measuring the frequency of crisis events to see if the 
benefits cover the costs. It is not the aim of this work to evaluate crisis probability. 
However, the data in this paper makes it possible to evaluate the probability of a crisis 
in which costs equal benefits. For the scenario shown in Table 7 the costs would be 
covered by the benefits if a crisis occurred every 10.7 years, meaning that the 
probability of a crisis which would offset costs in this scenario is 9.3% in average for 
the whole sample. 
Jeanne and Rancière (2009) discuss a model for international reserve holdings in which 
they calibrate the probability of a sudden stop to 10%, with output loss at 6.5% and the 
potential output growth at 3.3%.
10 The calibration of Jeanne and Rancière (2009) 
indicates that the scenario in Table 7 is a plausible one.  
 
                                                 
10   The authors also mention a range of variation from 0 to 25% for the probability of a sudden stop 





Table 7 – Cost-benefit relationship (base case) 
Country Benef/GDP Costs/GDP Country Benef/GDP Costs/GDP
Angola 10.98               2.91                 Kazakhstan 13.57                 2.18               
Argentina 13.16               1.34                 Latvia 15.10                 1.63               
Australia 14.23               0.13                 Lebanon 13.83                 11.68             
Austria 17.09                          --- Lithuania 13.23                 0.74               
Azerbaijan 11.89               0.85                 Malaysia 12.36                 0.49               
Belgium 18.43                          --- Mexico 11.60                 0.67               
Bolivia 13.42               2.51                 Netherlands 17.64                            ---
Brazil 14.64               1.32                 New Zealand 14.37                 0.88               
Bulgaria 14.41               1.84                 Nigeria 10.80                 1.78               
Canada 14.33                          --- Norway 20.23                 0.06               
Chile 12.38               0.65                 Pakistan 11.87                 1.37               
China 11.95               0.94                 Panama 11.98                 0.56               
Colombia 12.97               0.20                 Paraguay 11.68                 4.52               
Costa Rica 12.10               0.88                 Peru 11.96                 1.58               
Croatia 14.21               1.22                 Philippines 12.33                 1.65               
Czech Republic 14.47               0.05                 Poland 14.46                 0.85               
Denmark 17.30               0.06                 Portugal 16.76                            ---
Ecuador 11.79               0.45                 Romania 13.85                 1.59               
Estonia 14.49                          --- Russia 14.11                 2.52               
Finland 16.41               0.03                 Senegal 12.55                 0.49               
France 17.28                          --- Serbia 14.62                 3.13               
Georgia 12.81               1.41                 Singapore 12.42                            ---
Germany 16.23                          --- Slovakia 14.05                 0.08               
Greece 16.54                          --- Slovenia 15.40                            ---
Guatemala 11.91               0.56                 South Africa 13.25                 0.56               
Honduras 12.05               1.06                 South Korea 13.29                 0.59               
Hong Kong 14.79                          --- Spain 15.94                            ---
Hungary 15.47               1.62                 Sweden 17.30                            ---
Iceland 25.00               1.93                 Switzerland 15.68                 0.54               
India 12.49               0.99                 Taiwan 11.77                 0.45               
Indonesia 11.59               0.83                 Thailand 12.39                 0.55               
Ireland 24.78                          --- Turkey 14.10                 0.68               
Israel 14.90                          --- Ukraine 14.91                 1.77               
Italy 16.53                          --- United Kingdom 18.64                            ---
Jamaica 14.87               1.16                 Uruguay 13.17                 1.71               
Japan 15.41                          ---  
Some alternative scenarios are shown in Table 8. In fact, there is no simple rule to select 
a single scenario, which means that the choice of the cost and benefit relationship is a 
risk management decision. It is important to remember that self-insurance is not 
necessarily the only motivation for holding reserves but is one of the objectives of a 
complex set of decisions in a world with high liquidity and free capital flow. This 




discussion. Table 8 may give indications of the cost-benefit relationship relative to the 
self insurance question in a crisis.  
Table 8 – Scenarios for the cost-benefit relationship 
GDP Int Res Invest Benefits Costs Years Probability
5.00 1.00 8.08 1.34 6.01 16.63%
5.00 3.00 8.08 1.14 7.11 14.07%
10.00 1.00 14.45 1.34 10.75 9.30%
10.00 3.00 14.45 1.14 12.72 7.86%
15.00 1.00 20.82 1.34 15.50 6.45%
15.00 3.00 20.82 1.14 18.32 5.46%
20.00 1.00 27.19 1.34 20.24 4.94%
20.00 3.00 27.19 1.14 23.93 4.18%  
4- Conclusions 
There is no single motivation for countries to accumulate international reserves. 
Although some authors argue that there is a trend towards accumulating reserves for 
some hidden mercantilist agenda within foreign exchange rate policy, the evidence in 
the literature shows that this is not the main driving argument in many emerging 
markets. In fact, there is evidence in the literature that the precautionary motive is one 
of the reasons for emerging market economies to increase their international reserve 
holdings. These two motivations may take discussion of international reserves levels 
from a single endogenous consequence to a single exogenous decision, but it seems that 
the puzzle is more complex than any single view of the problem and that decision 
regarding the level of international reserves fall somewhere between these two 
extremes. 
Aside from the motivation for holding international reserves, this paper provides 
empirical evidence for the fact that in the 2008-2010 crisis international reserves 
worked as self insurance for many economies, since countries with more international 
reserves had less adjustments costs in terms of GDP. This empirical evidence is in line 
with the discussion of the benefits of holding reserves as the data show that the strategy 
of accumulating reserves helped some markets to avoid the worst scenario in the 2008-




Note that the precautionary motivation discussed by some authors in the literature as the 
main driver for the process of accumulating international reserves still leaves open the 
question of adequacy, since an optimal level of reserves is a function of risk aversion, 
the probability of crisis and the costs and benefit of this self insurance. The data 
discussed here is not intended to address the adequacy problem, but they give some 
dimension to the cost-benefit relationship and make it clear that with regard to cost-
benefit, the choice is a risk management decision.  
There is no accepted standard to establish a methodology for evaluating the optimal 
level for international reserves. In a world of high liquidity and free capital flow the 
level of international reserves will continue to be a puzzle for several economies. 
Suppose this puzzle of establishing a methodology for international reserves adequacy 
is solved by a given economy, then its next step may be the design of a wealth 
management policy which takes more risks with investments to offset the carrying 
costs.  
As a suggestion for further studies, it may be worth evaluating the risk management 
strategy of holding international reserves for a specific country in more detail and the 
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